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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
THROUGH FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTSt
Jochen Abr. Frowein*
I.

INTRODUCTION-THE EUROPEAN TRADITION: RECOGNITION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT

The conception of fundamental rights as natural rights of
human beings developed in European legal thinking mainly in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and also Immanuel Kant should be mentioned. 1
But it was in the new world that the principles of fundamental
human rights were first put into practice. 2 A little more than ten
years after the first American declarations, the "Declaration des
droits de l'homme et du citoyen" was adopted in Paris; it remains part of French constitutional law today. 3 But, unlike the
development in the United States, the French guarantees could
t Thomas M. Cooley Lecture delivered at the Univer~ity of Michigan Law School on
Nov. 1, 1983.
• Director, Max Planck Institute for Public International Law, Heidelberg; Professor,
University of Heidelberg; Vice-President, European Commission of Human Rights.
I. See Oestreich, Die Entwicklung der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, in
BETTERMANN-NEUMANN-NIPPERDEY, DIE GRUNDRECHTE Vol. 1/1, 1966, at 1; Shestack, The
Jurisprudence of Human Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, LEGAL AND
Poucv lssuEs 69 (T. Meron ed. 1984). ·
2. See The Bill of Rights, U.S. CoNsT. amends. 1-X; The Virginia Bill of Rights
(1776), reprinted in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF
1829-30, at 895-96 (1830).
3. By the reference in the preamble of the constitution of 1958 which reads:
Le Peuple fran<;ais proclame solennellement son attachement aux Droits de
/'Homme et aux principes de la souverainete nationale tels qu'ils sont defi.nis
par la Declaration de 1789, confi.rmee et completee par le preambule de la Constitution de 1946 . . . .
(The French people solemnly proclaim their commitment to the Rights of Man
and the principles of national sovereignty such as they are defined by the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and completed by the preamble of the Constitution of
1946.)
CONST. (Fr.) preamble.
The Conseil Constitutionnel decided for the first time in 1970 that the preamble and
thereby the declaration is binding constitutional law. See Judgment of June 19, 1970,
Con. const., Fr., 1971 Revue du Droit Public 203.
5
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not be enforced by judges. The legislature was seen as the last
arbiter of whether or not a specific regulation could be accepted
as compatible with the bill of rights. 4 As soon as the legislature
had adopted a law, that law could not be challenged. In 1958 a
very limited challenge became possible, through the Conseil
Constitutionnel, but only before the formal promulgation of the
law. 5
In Germany the first bills of rights were introduced in the
early nineteenth century, after the conclusion of Napoleon's invasion. 6 A good example is the constitution of Baden; the German state bordering France adopted a constitution in 1818. 7
Most of the German states guaranteed the rights to life and liberty, to the enjoyment of property, and to equality under the
law by the beginning or the middle of the century. But as in
France, judicial protection of these rights was impossible against
the legislature and was rather weak against the administration.
Although recent research has revealed that in a number of cases
courts have protected rights, for instance, the freedom of religion, against administrative decisions, the main function of the
guarantee of rights was to influence the legislature and to provide guidance or even a program of reform. 8
When the German Empire was founded in 1871 as a federal
state, with the states having a very strong position, no federal
bill of rights was adopted, mainly because the unitary influence
of such a guarantee was seen as unacceptable. It may be of interest that the German Empire in fact brought about important
effects of legal unification later through legislation in the field of
fundamental rights, for instance freedom of religion and freedom of movement. 9
Why do I mention these historic examples? I want to show
that on the European continent an important tradition has long
existed concerning bills of rights. What was lacking, until recently, was real judicial protection, especially against the legisla4.

For the French tradition, see J.-L. QuERMONNE, LE GouvERNEMENT DE LA FRANCE

SOUS LA VE REPUBLJQUE

5. P.E.

333-402 (1980).

GoosE, DIE NoRMENKONTROLLE DURCH DEN FRANZOSISCHEN CoNSEIL CONSTITU-

TIONNEL (Schriften zum offentlichen Recht Bd.

212, 1973).

Die rechtliche Tragweite der Grundrechte in der deutschen Verfassungsentwicklung des 19. Jahrhunderts, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR E.R. HUBER 139 (1973), reprinted in u. SCHEUNER, STAATSTHEORIE UNO STAATSRECHT 633 (1978).
7. See 1 E.R. HUBER, DoKUMENTE ZUR DEUTSCHEN VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE 156
6.

Scheuner,

(1961).
8. See Scheuner, supra note 6.
9. Huber, Grundrechte im Bismarckschen Reichssystem,
ScHEUNER 163 (1973).

in FESTSCHRIFT FOR

U.
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ture. This protection came into existence after the First World
War in Austria and, to a very limited extent, in Germany. 10 Only
after the Second World War did Europe experience a change
which led to the introduction of judicial protection of fundamental rights in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Italy, to a limited extent in France, and more recently in Spain and Portugal. 11 Britain, without a written constitution, stands apart.
Ireland, though belonging to the common law tradition, has accepted the American example. The Irish Supreme Court has jurisdiction for judicial review on the· basis of fundamental
rights. 12
When the European Convention of Human Rights was signed
in 1950, did the countries realize that they had introduced a legal revolution? I believe not. The ratifying nations believed that
the rather general principles enshrined in this international bill
of rights already were well-protected in all states. How could a
country like Britain, with her proud history of protecting the
liberties of Englishmen, see any danger in ratifying the Convention? While it was important for the ratifying nations to state
that the European countries, including the liberated western
part of Germany, agreed on basic principles, it was taken as a
matter of course that these principles were well-protected in all
the old European democracies.
II.

THE IMPACT OF THE CONVENTION: AN EMERGING TRADITION
OF JUDICIALLY-ENFORCEABLE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

For a long time those who had prepared and signed the Con10.

For

the

historical

Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit

development

in

der

in

Germany,

Bundesrepublik

see

Friesenhahn,

Deutsch land,

Die

111

VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER GEGENWART 88, 92 (Beitriige zum ausliindischen offentlichen Recht und Volkerrecht No. 36, 1962); Scheuner, Die Uberlieferung der deutschen Staatsgerichtsbarkeit im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, in 1 BuNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT UND GRUNDGESETZ 1 (C. Starck 1976). For the development in Austria, see
Melichar, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Osterreich, in VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER GEGENWART 439 (Beitriige zum ausliindischen offentlichen Recht und
Volkerrecht No. 36, 1962).
11. For Italy, see Sandulli, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Italien, in
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER GEGENWART 292 (Beitriige zum ausliindischen offentlichen Recht und Volkerrecht No. 36, 1962); for Spain, see Villal6n, Zwei Jahre
Verfassungsrechtsprechung in Spanien, 43 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES ()FFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 70 (1983); for Portugal, see Thomashausen, Der

Freiheitsbegri/f, die Grundrechte und der Grundrechtsschutz in der neuen Portugiesischen Verfassung vom 2 April 1976, 8 EUROPAISHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT 1 (1981).
12. See generally J.M. KELLY, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 219 (1980) (discussing article
34.3.2 of the Irish Constitution).
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vention proved right. The Convention entered into force on September 3, 1953; the United Kingdom was the first country to
ratify.· One may say that for almost twenty years the Convention
remained a sleeping beauty, frequently referred to but without
much impact. 13 During this time, some amendments were made
to the Austrian and German codes of criminal procedure but
they were viewed as not very important. 14 But after 1973 things
changed rapidly. Today, there are few countries that have been
subject for some time to the jurisdiction of the Commission on
the basis of individual applications 1 ~ that have not been found
in violation of the Convention at least once. Several states with
proud records of protecting fundamental rights, such as Britain
and Belgium, have had to comply with several Court judgments
establishing a violation of the Convention and granting compensation to the applicant.
How is this dramatic change in direction to be explained? I
leave aside those cases where, under emergency conditions, security forces went beyond what is permissible under article 3
outlawing inhuman treatment. 16 That, unfortunately, can happen anywhere. Much more interesting are the cases in which
Convention organs have found that the application of a particular national law has violated a specific right guaranteed in the
Convention. Let me mention four examples:
1. A prisoner could bring a suit in a court of law only if
authorized by the Home Secretary. Commission and
Court found a violation of article 6 guaranteeing access to
court in civil matters. 17
2. A mother of an illegitimate child was not the legal
mother before she had recognized the child. This was
•13. Statistics show that in 1973 the Commission adopted 3 reports in admissible
cases under Art. 31, 10 in 1978, 21 in 1981, and 21 in 1983. Of the 70 judgments of the
Court delivered up to July 13, 1983, 40 were rendered during the last five years. See
EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES AND STATISTICS 11 (1983).
(DH (84) 1).
14. The general limit for detention on remand in Article 121 of the German Code on
Criminal Procedure, see THE GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (H. Niebler trans.
1965) (American Series of Foreign Penal Codes No. 10), was introduced because of cases
brought under art. 5, para. 3 of the Convention.
15. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 ("The Commission may receive petitions ...
from any person . . . claiining to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this convention . . . . ") [hereinafter cited as
Convention].
16. One of the most prominent cases is Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 25
(Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1978).
17. See Golder v. United Kingdom, 1 E.H.R.R. 524 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1975).
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found to be a violation of her right to respect for her
family life. 18
3. An accused, convicted in the first instance, did not
get a free defense counsel for an appeal limited to legal
questions because the court, on the basis of a statute,
found the free defense counsel to be unnecessary. Commission and Court found a violation of article 6, paragraph 3(c), which grants the right to a free defense counsel if the accused cannot pay and the interests of justice
so require. 19
4. People interned on the basis of mental illness could
not get court control, either because there was no remedy, 20 or the remedy was of a merely formal nature. 21 No
court proceeding could consider the lawfulness of the detention. Commission and Court found a violation of article 5, paragraph 4, the habeas corpus rule of the
Convention.
I have chosen these examples because it may well be that in
1960 both the Commission and the Court would have found a
way to uphold the rules underlying these national decisions. The
arguments that prisoners ought to be subject to inherent limitations on their freedom; that "family" as defined under article 8
excludes the "illegitimate" family; that the "interests of justice"
do not require free defense counsel on appeal of a point of law;
and that the special difficulties of establishing mental illness
may require detention without court control all could have
served as justifications for the rules concerned. What are the
reasons behind the new approach of Commission and Court?
A probable first reason is a growing awareness that violations
of fundamental rights under the Convention, like violations in a
national context with an existing bill of rights, should not be
seen as a tragedy in itself but rather as a failure which should be
remedied. The Convention is viewed as a remedy which should
be used as effectively as possible.
This attitude probably could have developed only_ after a period of time during which the member states became accustomed to the procedure before Commission and Court and developed a certain confidence in those proceedings. And I would
18.
19.
20.
1979).
21.

See Marckx v. Belgium, 2 E.H.R.R. 330 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1979).
See Pakelli v. Germany, 6 E.H.R.R. 1 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1983).
See Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 2 E.H.R.R. 387 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights
See X v. United Kingdom, 4 E.H.R.R. 188 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1981).
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suggest that the interstate application brought by Ireland
against the United Kingdom played a role in this change of perspective which cannot be underestimated. 22 It was established
that even a country like Britain is not above the possibility of
being found in violation of the Convention, even of article 3 forbidding inhuman treatment. The Convention had to be used to
protect people in reality.
Judicial activism may of course be dangerous, especially in an
international context. Can these developments be analyzed as
instances of judicial activism? Much depends on the perspective
one has. The best check against unjustified activism would seem
to be a strong consensus in Commission and Court composed of
lawyers with different backgrounds, representing different legal
traditions. All my examples concern cases where a large majority
came to the conclusion that a violation had occurred.
Of course, doubts may still exist. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice criticized the majority in his dissent in the Tyrer case 23 concerning
judicial corporal punishment, for using article 3 "as a vehicle for
indirect penal reform, for which it was not intended." 24 In Tyrer,
Commission and Court by very large majorities found judicial
corporal punishment-birching-to be degrading treatment in
violation of article 3. 25 Here we see a very basic disagreement
over the judicial character of the Convention. How could one
doubt that bills of rights in many countries' legal systems have
proved and should prove to be "vehicles of indirect penal
reform"?
Hans Huber, a very highly regarded Swiss constitutional lawyer, has described fundamental rights as a type of countermovement built into a legal system. 26 It may not be out of proportion to call them a sort of conscience within the legal order
which should control and correct developments of the normal
lawmaking procedures. At least when it represents a strong consensus, a Convention decis'ion upholding fundamental rights will
comport roughly with the conscience of most European nations,
without impinging significantly on national autonomy. To this
22. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 25 (Eur. Ct. Hurn. Rights 1978). The
case concerned especially the use of the five so-called "deep interrogation" techniques,
which the Commission found to be torture, see 19 Y.B. EuR. CoNv. ON HuM. RIGHTS 512,
the Court "only" inhuman treatment.
23. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 1 (Eur. Ct. Hurn. Rights 1978).
24. Id. at 24 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting).
.
25. Id. at 8-12; see also Tyrer, Report of the Commission of Dec. 14, 1976, at 13-15
(Eur. Cornrn'n Hurn. Rights) (Application No. 5856/72).
26. Huber, Uber die Konkretisierung der Grundrechte, in DER STAAT ALS AUFGABE,
GEDENKSCHRIFT FOR MAX IMBODEN 199, 201 (1972).

FALL

1984]

Integration Through Fundamental Rights

11

extent, the Convention will contribute to European integration
by nurturing the development of a pan-European conscience. Of
course, the notions of what rights are fundamental cannot be
petrified at a specific moment_ in time. Such notions have to answer new questions put by new social conditions. And who could
doubt that these social conditions are influenced by public opinion, awareness of problems and even the general "Zeitgeist"?

III.

SOME WEAKNESSES IN THE CONVENTION'S POWER TO
PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

If this picture, which may be novel to many of you, looks attractive at first sight for somebody who knows of the achievements of the United States Supreme Court, let us not forget the
Convention's very important inadequacies. There are many.
First, the procedure, calling for hearing by the Commission
before hearing by Court, is rather cumbersome. We cannot
change it however. Second, until now, the Strasbourg organs,
Commission and Court, have been part-time bodies. This creates
great difficulties. One may doubt, however, whether full-time organs would currently be acceptable to the member States. In
principle, one European Court of Human Rights with jurisdiction to decide applications would certainly be preferable. 27 But
it does not appear that the ratifying states would be willing to
agree to that change soon. Also, the argument is made that fulltime judges would lose contact with the realities in the different
legal systems of the ratifying countries. I personally don't see
any real problem there.
The most important drawback of the Convention system is
the lack of uniformity of the internal applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights. 28 The Convention is not internally applicable in Britain, Ireland, and the Scandinavian
states. This means that national judges cannot rely on the Convention in these countries. The consequence is, of course, that
many lawyers will not be familiar with the system. In Britain,
this lack of familiarity has been overcome during the recent
years because of the activities of some members of the London
Bar. One would strongly hope that this weakness of the Conven27. See Frowein, Zur Fortentwicklung des' europiiischen Menschen- und Rechtrechtsschutzes, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR KARL CARSTENS (forthcoming).
28. See A.Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW
(1983).
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tion system can be terminated. Discussions are occurring in Britain and some of the Scandinavian countries about whether to
transform the Convention into the law of the state. I am sure
that Professor Jacobs will mention these discussions. 29 This
transformation would have great importance.
In the countries where the Convention is internally applicable,
its role is rather different. In some jurisdictions the Convention
is frequently applied by national courts. This is true for Austria,
where it has the rank of constitutional law, and for Switzerland. 30 But the courts also look to the Convention in Germany
and France. Where internal guarantees of fundamental rights
are stronger than the guarantees of the Convention, it is clear
that the Convention's role will be limited.
The fact that the Convention is not applied internally in several countries creates considerable difficulties for the Convention
organs, because they have no national decision before them that
answers the questions that must be addressed under the Convention. It is clear that countries that do not apply the Convention internally will have to answer more frequently before the
Convention organs. Britain has been found in violation of the
Convention more often than any other country, a fact that may
be due to this situation.
You may ask whether it would be possible to read into the
Convention's text the obligation to apply the Convention internally within each ratifying state. Proposals of that sort were
made rather early on the basis of article 1, according to which
the parties agree to secure the rights in Section I to "everyone
within their jurisdiction," and article 13, which states that "everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy." 31 But one has
to admit that these provisions also can be interpreted under the
dualistic theory that recognizes parallel rights in the laws of ratifying states. Since it was well-known in 1950 that Britain would
not apply the Convention internally, an obligation to so apply
the Convention would have had to be established in much
clearer terms. The Court has stated recently that no such obliga29. See Jacobs, Towards a United Kingdom Bill of Rights, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 29
(1984).
30. For examples, see A.Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 28, at 93-106, 116-124 (1983).
31. See Buergenthal, The Effect of the European Convention on Human Rights on
the Internal Law of Member States, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
79 (International and Comparative Law Quarterly Supplementary Publication No. 11,
1965).
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tion exists. 32
Of course, if one speaks of weak points one must not forget
that the right of individual application to the Commission,
under article 25, is not automatic. Only four states have not accepted the right of individual application: Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta. But there is no formal obligation of renewal of the
right for the other states. Britain has set a very bad example by
failing to renew article 25 for the Isle of Man, after the decision
in the Tyrer case. 33 Fortunately, as yet no other country has reacted to a finding of a violation by failing to renew the right of
individual application. One would hope that this remains a
unique example.

32. Silver v. United Kingdom, 5 E.H.R.R. 347 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1983). Paragraph 113 of the judgment reads:
The principles that emerge from the Court's jurisprudence on the interpretation
of Article 13 include the following:
(a) where an individual has an arguable claim to be the victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention, he should have a remedy
before a national authority in order both to have his claim decided and,
if appropriate, to obtain redress [see Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2 E.H.R.R. 214, 238 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1978));
(b) the authority referred to in Article 13 may not necessarily be a judicial authority but, if it is not, its powers and the guarantees which it
affords are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is effective [see Klass, 2 E.H.R.R. at 239);
(c) although no single remedy may itself entirely satisfy the require'
ments of Article 13, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do so [see, mutatis mutandis, X v. United Kingdom, 4
E.H.R.R. 188, 205 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1981); Van Droogenbroeck v.
Belgium, 4 E.H.R.R. 443, 467 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1982));
(d) neither Article 13 nor the Convention in general lays down for the
Contracting States any given manner for ensuring within their internal
law the effective implementation of any of the provisions of the Convention-for example, by incorporating the Convention into domestic law
[see Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden, 1 E.H.R.R. 617, 631
(Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1976)].
It follows from the last-mentioned principle that the application of Article 13
in a given case will depend upon the manner in which the Contracting State
concerned has chosen to discharge its obligation under Article 1 directly to secure to anyone within its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms set out in section
1. [See Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 25 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights
1978).]
5 E.H.R.R. at 381-82.
33.

Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 1 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1978).
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RESTRICTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE CASE FOR
COMMON STANDARDS

A.

The Convention's Requirement of "Lawfulness"

I would now like to address myself to some specific questions
concerning the restriction of fundamental rights guaranteed in
the Convention. The Convention itself provides that many of its
rights may be restricted by law, subject to the satisfaction of
several requirements. The first requirement for such a restriction is that it be provided for by law, or that it be "lawful," as
articles 5, 10 and 11 say. What does that mean? There must be a
law as the basis for the interference with the fundamental rights.
For somebody brought up in the tradition of the rule of law developed on the European continent, that seems to be self-evident. But this is not a necessary conclusion about the nature of
a fundamental right, as illustrated by the famous case of Malone. 3" In that case, an English judge chose to apply the negative
rule that restriction of a fundamental right is legal unless forbidden by law and permited secret surveillance of telephone lines. 311
The Convention organs have rejected this theory in reversing the
English judge. 36 It seems clear that the reasoning of the English
judge is erroneous under the Convention's explicit language protecting the individual against interferences not provided for "by
law."
However, as Court and Commission have clearly accepted,
common law as developed in England and Ireland has the quality of law in this sense. Common law, like statutory law, should
be at least to some extent predictable. This is a difficult matter
which was before the Court and the Commission in the Sunday
Times case and came before the Commission again in a recent
case concerning common law crimes. 37 In the Sunday Times
case, the Court rightly stressed that a law must not only be adequately "accessible," but a norm cannot be regarded as a law
unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the cit34. See Malone v. United Kingdom, - E.H.R.R. - (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1984);
Malone v. United Kingdom, 5 E.H.R.R. 385 (Eur. Comm'n Hum. Rights 1982). The
Court confirmed the position of the Commission. The case was decided first in England.
See Malone v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No. 2), 1979 Ch. 344.
35. See Malone v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No. 2), 1979 Ch. 344.
36. Malone v. United Kingdom, - E.H.R.R. - (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1984); Malone
v. United Kingdom, 5 E.H.R.R. 385 (Eur. Comm'n Hum. Rights 1982).
37. See Gay News Ltd. and Lemon v. United Kingdom, 5 E.H.R.R. 123 (Eur.
Comm'n Hum. Rights 1982).
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izen to regulate his conduct. 38 He must be able, if need be with
appropriate advice, to foresee to a degree that is reasonable in
the circumstances the consequences which a given action may
entail. The Court had to admit, however, that those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty. Experience shows this to be unattainable. The Court rightly underlines
that while certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train
excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with
changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws inevitably are
couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague
and whose interpretation and application are questions of
practice. 39
There is an interesting uncertainty to the question of the extent of the 'responsibility of the Convention organs to determine
whether national organs have applied their law correctly when
interfering with fundamental rights. Somebody accustomed to
systems of internal protection of fundamental rights would have
no difficulty seeing that the Convention organs can never consider the correctness of the application of the national law, but
can only determine whether the specific legal basis of a particular decision was used arbitrarily. 40 However, the European Court
of Human Rights has not adopted this view of the scope of its
power of judicial review. Some judgments can be interpreted as
holding that the Court has jurisdiction to determine even the
lawfulness of the interference under national law. 41 This would
of course be a quite astonishing result, since Commission and
Court are certainly less well-equipped than national courts to
decide matters of national law.
38.

According to the Court:

Firstly the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have
an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable
to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a "law" unless it is
formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct:
he must be able-if need be with appropriate advice-to forsee, to a degree that
is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may
entail.
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 245, 271 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1979).
39.

Id.

40.

See J.A.

GERICHTSBARKEIT

FROWEIN, DER EUROPAJSCHE GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ UND DIE NATIONALE

13 (1983).

41. See Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 2 E.H.R.R. 387, 404-06 (Eur. Ct. Hum.
Rights 1979).
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The Purpose of a Restriction: ls It "Necessary in a
Democratic Society"?

In determining whether a particular restriction of a fundamental right is compatible with the Convention, Commission
and Court next must determine whether a national legislature
has imposed that restriction for one of the permissible aims
listed in the Convention's specific restrictive clauses. Article 10,
paragraph 2 makes it possible to restrict freedom of expression
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety; for the prevention of disorder or crime; for the protection
of health or morals; for the protection of the reputation or rights
of others; for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence; or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
of the judiciary. This is a long list which makes it easy to categorize the restriction under one of the headings. Indeed, none of
the items listed above has caused any difficulties so far for the
Convention organs.
Much more difficult, however, is the next and last condition
for the restrictions. In order to uphold on this final ground, Convention organs must find a restriction "necessary in a democratic society."42 How far can the control of the Convention organs go in this respect? It seems beyond doubt that necessity
may not be the same in all twenty-one Convention countries.
This can be seen easily if one compares such notions as
"morals," "security of state," "public order." Matters of this sort
cannot be judged without regard to the specific traditions, conditions and dangers prevailing in a given society. On the other
hand, it is also clear that the Convention organs must have some
control. 43
V.

THE STANDARD FOR CONVENTION DEFERENCE: A "MARGIN OF
APPRECIATION" FOR NATIONAL LEGISLATURES AND COURTS

Deciding whether a given restriction of a fundamental right is
"necessary in a democratic society" thus inevitably calls upon
the Convention organs to strike a balance between normative
42. Convention, art. 8.
43. The reference to a "democratic society" would also seem to imply that it is the
democratic legislature that has to make the first choice and take the first decision. The
specific legitimacy of the democratic process concerning the interference with the rights
guaranteed is recognized here.
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standards and differing national circumstances. In striking this
balance, Commission and Court purport to grant national legislatures and judicial organs a "margin of appreciation." 44 But
how far have the Convention organs gone to control that margin
of appreciation? According to the Court, supervision by the Convention organs is not limited to ascertaining whether a state exercised its discretion "reasonably, carefully and in good faith."
In the Court's view, even a state so acting remains subject to
control through the Court's determination of whether the conduct is compatible with the European Convention on Human
Rights.
The problems of exercising such control were quite visible in
the decisions on the cases of Handyside, 45 Sunday Times 46 and
Dudgeon. 47 Handyside concerned the confiscation of pornographic literature. Sunday Times determined the compatibility
with the Convention of an injunction to publication of an article.
The national court had threatened the publisher with contempt
should it have published in the face of an injunction. In Dudgeon, the legislation in Northern Ireland on homosexuality was at
issue.
A.

The Rationality Test of Handyside: Have National
Authorities· Acted Reasonably and in Good Faith?

In the case of Handyside, the Court stressed that international control is subsidiary and concluded that the English
courts were entitled to think that the book could have damaging
results for the morals of children and juveniles. 48
In the Sunday Times judgment, the majority was of the opinion that when a restriction seeks to protect the authority of the
judiciary, a court may determine compatibility with the Convention under far more objective criteria than it may apply to a restriction that seeks to protect moral standards. 49 Since the
Times case raised only the former concern, the Court was not
44. For a critical evaluation, see O'Donnell, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine:
Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTs.

Q. 474 (1982),
45.
46.
47.
48.
1976).
49.
1979).

Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 E.H.R.R. 737 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1976).
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 245 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1979).
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 E.H.H.R. 149 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1981).
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 E.H.R.R. 737, 755-57 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 245, 282 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights
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satisfied that the interference was necessary. It stressed the fact
that responsibility for the thalidomide disaster, which lay at the
heart of the Sunday Times dispute, raised issues of general public interest. The Court came to the final conclusion that· the restriction proved not to be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued.
The strong dissent by nine judges50 showed that the violation
of article 10 established by the judgment had something of an
accidental nature to it. The minority would have applied the
formula used in Handyside. According to this rationality test,
the Court must uphold a restriction imposed by national authorities if it determines that they acted in good faith, reasonably,
and with due care in evaluating the danger to the protectable
interests listed in paragraph 2 of article 10. To this test the dissenters would have added consideration of whether a measure
restricting freedom of expression is proportional to the legitimate aim pursued. The dissent stressed that the latter consideration looms especially large for any society that seeks to remain
democratic. They found that the House of Lords was entitled to
think that the publication of the article in question would have
detrimental effects upon the due administration of justice in relation to actions pending before the courts at the relevant time.

B. The Proportionality Test: Is the Restriction of a
Fundamental Right Proportionate to the Social Need
Claimed for It?
Convention organs may consider two possible standards for
deference to national -organs: the rationality test and the proportionality test. The tension between these two approaches appears most clearly in the Dudgeon judgment of October 22,
1981. 111 The Court had to consider the legislation on homosexuality in Northern Ireland. Homosexual acts between consenting
adult males still constituted a crime under Northern Irish legislation. No prosecutions in fact took place, but the applicant in
the case before the Court had been threatened with prosecution.
In passing this restrictive legislation, the United Kingdom government apparently had relied on the specific social and cultural
conditions prevailing in Northern Ireland. The Court stressed
that the United Kingdom government had acted carefully and in
50. Id. at 285-95 (dissenting opinion).
51. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 E.H.H.R. 149 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1981).
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good faith. The opinion adds that the government made every
effort to arrive at a balanced judgment between the differing
viewpoints before concluding that such a substantial body of
opinion in Northern Ireland was opposed to a change in the law
that no further action should be taken. Nevertheless, the Court
stated that good faith and due care alone could not decide the
question of whether interference with the applicant's private life
was "necessary in a democratic society." 52 It is for the Court to
make the final evaluation of whether the reasons it has found to
be relevant were sufficient in the circumstances. The test the
Court adopted was whether the interference complained of was
proportionate to the social need claimed for it.
In analyzing this matter further, the Court referred to
changed attitudes towards homosexual behavior. In support of
its position, the Court noted that in the great majority of the
member states of the Council of Europe it is no longer considered necessary or appropriate to subject homosexual practices,
at least of the kind in question, to criminal sanctions. The Court
could not overlook the marked changes which had occurred in
this regard in the domestic law of the member states. The Court
then stressed that the authorities in Northern Ireland had refrained in recent years from enforcing the law _in respect of private homosexual acts between competent consenting males over
the age of twenty-one. No evidence was adduced to show that
this practice was injurious to moral standards in Northern Ireland, or that there has been any public demand for stricter enforcement of the law.
Under these conditions, the Court did not see a "pressing social need" 53 to make such acts criminal offenses, in the absence
of risk of harm to vulnerable sections of society requiring protection, or of effects on the public. On the issue of proportionality,
the Court found that such justifications as existed for retaining
the law in force unamended were outweighed by the detrimental
effects that the very existence of the legislation could have on
the life of a person of homosexual orientation. Although members of the public who regard homosexuality as immoral may be
shocked, offended, or disturbed by the commission by others of
private homosexual acts, such a reaction cannot on its own warrant the application of penal sanctions when only consenting
adults are involved.
The Court here seems to base its reasoning on two considera52.
53.

Id. at 162-65.
Id. at 167.
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tions. It is not quite clear which is the prevailing one. On the
one hand the Court stresses that the legislation in Northern Ireland had not been enforced. On the other hand, the Court seems
to rely on the objective consequences of such a criminal statute
on a homosexual personality. The latter reasoning is to me
rather weak. Can it be the Court's or the Commission's task to
find out whether it is correct to penalize homosexual conduct?
Determining whether particular behavior ought to be subject to
criminal sanctions inevitably rests on political, not legal, decisions. Societies traditionally have left such decisions to their legislative bodies, partly because no objective standards can be
found. The case is quite unlike outlawing a particular form of
punishment, such as birching, which itself is degrading. The first
argument, however, which relies on the fact that the criminal
statute lay unenforced before being raised in this particular case
as a sword of Damocles, would seem to be sufficient to show that
. the law really was not necessary, and was therefore
disproportionate.
The principle of proportionality is certainly a most important
criterion. By intelligent application of this principle, Convention
organs can give some structure to their efforts to strike a balance
between fundamental rights and national autonomy. Such a balance gives meaningful content to the "margin of appreciation"
left to the states under several Convention articles. It seems that
the Convention organs inevitably will be unable to offer any
fixed determinations of what constitutes necessity in a democratic society. It is a difficult line that must be drawn between
on the one hand watering down the Convention guarantees, and
on the other hand permitting members of the Commission or
Court to give effect to their own political or general viewpoints.
Here again, unanimity or quasi-unanimity of Commission reports or judgments is of crucial importance. If this can be
reached, it is difficult to argue that it is just an individual position which has influenced the procedure.
VI.

TOWARD A EUROPEAN BILL OF RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE
CONVENTION IN THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

European integration through fundamental rights is already
occurring at Strasbourg. The process is a slow one. It cannot be
doubted, however, that a common denominator on many important issues concerning the protection of fundamental rights is
being found through decisions on individual applications. The
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criticism that this may sometimes jeopardize legal certainty is of
course not without relevance. The Convention organs must always be careful to remain within the European consensus that
can be deduced from the legal traditions and developments of
the member states taken together. 64 This can, however, never be
the lowest common denominator. It must be based on a comparison of the traditions along the lines that have been accepted by
the formulation of the Convention.
A.

Imposition of an Emerging Consensus by the Convention

A good example of this process would seem to be the case now
pending before the Court concerning criminal procedures in the
absence of the accused. The Italian proceeding at issue in the
cases of Colozza & Rubinat v. Italy 66 is of a peculiar nature, insofar as it must be rare to have a trial of that sort without the
accused being necessarily aware of it, or at least permitted to
reopen the proceeding. Mr. Rubinat, a Spanish sailor who had
been involved in a fight in Genoa, had left the country without
knowing that a criminal trial would be started against him. He
was convicted and sentenced to twenty-one years in prison.
When he consented to extradition from France-apparently
without getting legal advice, because France would not have extradited him-he had no remedy whatsoever. The Commission
found unanimously that his right to a fair trial had clearly been
violated. Here, the traditions of all the Convention countries except Italy viewed such a procedure as grossly unfair to the
accused.

B.

The Propriety of Imposition

1. Where the Convention's language is explicit- One may
put the question whether the Convention system as a whole has
sufficient legitimacy to interfere with important traditions in the
legal systems of the member states. But it would seem clear that
the Convention was drafted as an instrument that should produce real effects. 66 This is demonstrated in areas where the Con54. Mosler, Report on the Results of the Colloquy, in PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN EUROPE 333 (I. Maier ed. 1982).
·55, Report of the Commission of May 5, 1983 (Eur. Comm'n Hum. Rights) (Application Nos. 9024/80, 9317 /81).
56. The Court has held that the rights protected by the Convention are not "theoreti-
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vention provisions leave little room for interpretation. The minimum rights of the accused under article 6, paragraph 3 are good
examples. One case where Commission and Court unanimously
found against the Federal Republic of Germany provides an illustration. 57 Article 6, paragraph 3(e) guarantees the right to a
free interpreter. Free must mean without having to pay for the
interpreter. 118 Since there are no conditions attached to the provision, one can only conclude that free means once and for all. If
one includes provisions of that sort into a Convention and creates judicial organs to supervise the application of this Convention, the result must be clear. A Convention organ failing to give
effect to such plain language would appear so deferential to national autonomy as to be practically impotent.

2. Where the language may be either procedural or substantive- A slightly more difficult case is presented where there is a
clear provision, but it may be applied in a merely formal or in a
substantive way. Take the case X v. United Kingdom as an example.59 A mentally ill person could bring a habeas corpus procedure. But in this procedure, the court could only look to the
order made by the Home Secretary. The court could not control
the substantive grounds for detention. Could this be viewed as
conforming with article 5, paragraph 4 of the Convention, which
says that everyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to a hearing at which the lawfulness of his detention shall
be decided speedily by a tribunal? Commission and Court came
to the conclusion that a procedure which could not review the
substantive ground of the detention could not suffice. The Court
held that the right to judicial control must not be of such a
scope as to empower the tribunal to substitute its own discretion
for that of the decision-making authority. The review must,
however, be wide enough to bear on those conditions which, according to the Convention, are essential for the "lawful" detention of a person on the ground of unsoundness of mind, especially since the reasons capable of initially justifying such a
detention may cease to exist. In this case, an interpretation going beyond a merely formalistic compliance with the rule could
leave hardly any doubt as to the result.
Already more difficult may be the cases where Commission
cal or illusory but practical and effective." Airey v. Ireland, 2 E.H.R.R. 305, 314 (Eur. Ct.
Hum. Rights 1978).
57. Luedicke, Belkacem, and Koc v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2 E.H.R.R. 149
(Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1978).
58. In the French text it is "gratuitement."
59. 4 E.H.R.R. 188 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1981).
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and Court have interpreted the presumption of innocence under
article 6, paragraph 2 to bear on the validity of the reasons given
by criminal courts when assigning the costs of discontinued
criminal procedures. In Germany, Switzerland and Austria a
widespread practice still exists where such courts will themselves
pronounce on the culpability of an accused when they decide to
discontinue the procedures. Courts do that to justify a decision
not to reimburse the former accused. In response to this practice
the Commission started to take the rule concerning the presumption of innocence seriously, and questioned whether the
practice could be legal. 60 Two German cases were settled under
article 28 without a final decision. 61 A Swiss case went before the
Court after the Commission had unanimously found a violation.
The Court affirmed the Commission. 62
3. Where the language is ambiguous or deficient- An even
more difficult level is reached where there is practically no or
very little guidance in the wording of the Convention. Does the
right to form and to join trade unions include the right not to
join them? The argument that the article speaks of a freedom in
that respect should of course be seen as rather important. But
on the other hand, a specific clause concerning the negative freedom of association existing in the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights 63 was not inserted into the Convention. There
was nevertheless a very broad consensus in Commission and
Court that article 11 is breached where, only because of the refusal to join a specific trade union, workers are fired from their
jobs. 6 ' It is certain that it was of great influence in Commission ·
and Court that such a system is clearly illegal in almost all European countries.
4. Where consensus between nations is lacking- The most
difficult level is reached where the consensus between the European countries is low or nonexistent. This may prove to be the
crucial issue for the interpretation of article 6, paragraph 1,
which guarantees access to a court in the determination of civil
60. See Neubecker v. Federal Republic of Germany, 5 D. & R. 13 (Eur. Cornrn'n
Hurn. Rights 1976); Liebig v. Federal Republic of Germany, 5 D. & R. 58 (Eur. Cornrn'n
Hurn. Rights 1976).
61. Neubecker v. Federal Republic of Germany, 8 D. & R. 30 (Eur. Cornrn'n Hum.
Rights 1977); Liebig v. Federal Republic of Germany, 17 D. & R. 5 (Eur. Cornrn'n Hum.
Rights 1978).
62. Minelli v. Switzerland, 5 E.H.R.R. 554 (Eur. Ct. Hum Rights 1983).
63. See Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 20(2), G.A. Res.
217, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1949), reprinted in, 1948-49 U.N.Y.B. 535.
64. Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom, 4 E.H.R.R. 38 (Eur. Ct. Hum.
Rights 1981).
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rights and obligations. After thirty years, it is still completely
unclear what is covered by that notion. The Court has held that
disciplinary procedures terminating or suspending the right of a
medical doctor to practice, as well as the granting of an expropriation permit settling the lawfulness of an eventual expropriation, fall under this rule. 65 That means that a wide area of administrative law may be included in the notion. How far can
that go? Only a few European countries have experience with a
complete system of judicial review of administrative acts by
courts. Most countries still have a rather ·limited system of such
judicial review. From a logical point of view, it may be almost
impossible to distinguish the cases already decided from the
general area where the state, by administrative devices, regulates
the liberty of the citizen to avoid dangers for others. The case
raising that issue in principle may soon come before the Court.66
The examples I have just given will certainly show that the
Convention organs frequently have to face the choice between a
narrow and a wider interpretation. The consensus existing or developing in the European countries will be of great importance
for that choice to be made.
VII.

THE CONVENTION AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC

COMMUNITY: THE INTEGRATION EFFECT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

If one speaks of European integration, one cannot forget the
European Economic Community. The issue of human or fundamental rights in the Community legal system has had different
phases. Underestimated at first, it was then in danger of being
overestimated for some time. In a jurisprudence well established
by now, the European Court of Justice has recognized that the
fundamental rights protected by the Constitutions of the member states form an integral part of Community law. 67 International treaties for the protection of human rights, as binding on
the members of the Community as is the European Convention
on Human Rights, were ten years ago considered to furnish
65. Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, 4 E.H.R.R. 1 (Eur. Ct. Hum.
Rights 1981); Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden, 5 E.H.R.R. 35 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights
1982).
66. It is now pending before the Court in Bentham v. The Netherlands. A majority
of the Commission found that Art. 6 is not applicable. See 6 E.H.R.R. 283 (Eur. Comm'n
Hum. Rights 1983).
67. See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1125; Stauder v. City of Yim, 1969
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 419.
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guidelines and indications for the standards to be adopted m
Community law. 68
The German Federal Constitutional Court was not satisfied
with the protection of fundamental rights in the Community
system. A famous decision by this Court, 69 and some indications
that the Italian Constitutional Court could move in the same direction,70 have led to considerable activity by the Community in
the area of fundamental rights. The political organs of the Community have subscribed formally to the binding force of fundamental rights, including those protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. 71 In addition,the Commission of the
European Community has also formally proposed in a memorandum that the Community should become a party to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 72 Whether this will be possible is difficult to evaluate. The
technical problems are great. As an alternative to a formal accession, the Community could adopt the substantive provisions of
the Eur.opean Convention on Human Rights as internal Community law by a Community regulation based on article 235. 73 This
would be a practice similar to the old Canadian Bill of Rights.
Although it may seem doubtful whether this could finally lead to
judicial review of later regulations, one could at least expect the
European Court of Justice to view that regulation as confirming
its earlier jurisprudence about the binding nature of fundamental rights.
The discussions concerning the possible accession of the Community to the European Convention on Human Rights prove
what the German author Rudolf Smend in 1928 called the integration effect of fundamental rights. 74 A population may find its
68. Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3727, 3745 (Preliminary Ruling); Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219 (Preliminary Ruling). See generally GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ IN EUROPA (Beitriige zum ausliindischen offentlichen Recht und Volkerrecht No. 72, 1977).
69. Judgment of May 29, 1974, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 37 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 271; but see Judgment of June 23, 1981, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 58 BVerfG 1; for a critical discussion of the first decision, see Frowein,
Europaisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und Bundesuerfassungsgericht, in 2 BuNDESVERFAS·
SUNGSGERICHT UNO GRUNDGESETZ 187, 201 (1976); concerning the last decision see
Frowein, Anmerkung des Bearbeiters, 9 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT 179
(1982).
70. Judgment of Dec. 27, 1973, Corte const., Italy, 1974 Foro It. I 314.
71. Declaration of Apr. 5, 1977, 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 103) 1 (1977).
72. Memorandum of Apr. 4, 1979, BULL. EuR. COMM. (Supp. 1979-80) (No. 2/79).
73. See J.A. Frowein, Human Rights in International Law and Community Law, in
HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS 73,
77 (1979-80 H.L. 362).
74. R. Smend, Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht (1928), reprinted in STAATSRECHT-

26

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 18:1

identity in a catalogue of fundamental rights. Because the Community is developing into areas where it affects the population
more and more, such an identification could well help to improve the legitimacy of the system as a whole. It seems very
doubtful that the Community should draft its own catalogue of
fundamental rights. It would not be surprising if no consensus
on the formulation of important principles could be reached by
European governments at the present time. 75

VIII.

SOME PREDICTIONS

Paul Kauper, who was my teacher in constitutional law when I
studied as a foreign graduate student at the University of Michigan Law School in 1957-1958, once wrote an article describing
human rights as a tide in the history of mankind. 76 Of course the
tide is always coming and going. If I am not mistaken, there
have been high and low tides in the development of the protection of civil rights within the national system of the United
States even during the last years. An international system for
the protection of fundamental rights is certainly much more restricted by its political climate.
If one or two of the bigger European states ceased to adhere to
the right to individual application under article 25 of the Convention, the system would encounter great difficulties. An old
Swiss claim is that there should be no foreign judges interfering
with national conditions. Members of the Commission and of
the Court are to the greatest possible extent foreign judges looking into very internal matters. Let us hope that these organs will
be able during the coming years to gain the confidence of the
citizens in Europe, and through them of the governments and
ruling elites. Although we should not take it for granted, there
seems to be a growing awareness of the possibilities created by
the Convention in countries where the national judicial system is
not too well developed. One can witness a most interesting side
effect of the Convention system in that respect. Advocates who
realize that the existence of a general consensus in all or most
countries may be important for the Convention organs will try
to use a comparative method in arguing their position.
119 (2d ed. 1968).
Frowein, Europiiische Grundrechtsprobleme, in 2 DAS EUROPA DER ZWEITEN GENERATION, GEDACHTNISSCHRIFT FtlR CHRISTOPH SASSE 727, 737 (1981).
76. Kauper, Human Rights: A Tide in the Affairs of Men, U. MICH. L. QUADRANGLE
NOTES, Spring 1969, at 11.
LICHE ABHANDLUNGEN
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It was a special occasion when, in a case before the Commission, an English advocate referred to a decision by the Federal
Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany. He
tried to convince the Commission and later the Court that they
should take the same approach. From time to time one may find
that through the Convention procedures, a specific legal experience of one country may be transformed into a general system.
The same would seem to be true for the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice in Luxembourg.
The system we are working with is still of a very modest nature. However, it is the only international or supranational system for the protection of fundamental human rights that really
functions in a judicial manner. Let us hope that it can develop
smoothly.

